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THE EXECUTIVE'S SCAPEGOAT,
THE COURT'S BLIND EYE?
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Hollis V. Pfitsch*
An Arab American cab driver had a sobering question for
NAPALC's Executive Director, Karen K. Narasaki, as she made
her way to a press conference at the Japanese American memorial
a week after September 1 1 th . "How were the Japanese Americans
treated in the internment camps during WWII?" he asked. When
Narasaki asked why he posed the question, he replied, "I just want
to be prepared for what may happen in the future."
From Backlash, When American Turned on its Own, A
Preliminary Report to the 2001 Audit of Violence Against
Asian Pacific Americans, National Asian Pacific
American Legal Consortium (NAPALC).

Introduction
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, the U.S. government arrested hundreds of Arab,
Muslim, and South Asian immigrant men suspected of terrorism
2
1
connections.' The government later deported these men, many in secret. 3
But, the government did not charge them with September 11-related crimes.
Before arresting the "September 11 detainees," the government did not
attempt to establish that the men had any political affiliations that would
make them deportable.4 Instead, the scarce information available indicates
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2005, City University of New York School of Law. Many thanks to
Professors Ruthann Robson, Andrea McArdle, Franklin Siegel, and Sameer Ashar, all of City University
of New York School of Law, for direction, support, and assistance on this paper. Contact information:
pfitschh@mail.law.cuny.edu, 718-406-4923.
DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE
WAR ON TERRORISM 25 (2003).
2
Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a memo closing all "special interest"

immigration hearings-many of the same hearings considered the immigration violations of the
September 11 detainees. Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, to all
Immigration Judges and Court Administrators, Cases Requiring Special Procedures (Sept. 21,2001),
available at http://archive.aclu.org/court/creppy-memo.pdf (last visited May 2, 2004). See discussion
infra Part V regarding North JerseyMedia Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert denied,
538 U.S. 1056 (2003); DetroitFree Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692 (6th Cir. 2002).
3
COLE,supra note 1, at 25-26.
4
See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES
IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (June 2003), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/igspecrl.htm. This is in marked contrast to the government's anti-terrorism
efforts against immigrants before September 11, in which certain individuals were targeted based on their
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the government arrested the men based on the assumption that those
connections existed because of their perceived race, ethnicity, religion, or
nationality. 5 The government then relied on routine immigration violations
to detain the men for investigation and deport them.6 The administrative
immigration context hindered the detainees from challenging this selective
enforcement of immigration regulations.7
Immigrants 8 are easy scapegoats in times of national insecurity.
From the Palmer Raids in 1920, to Japanese internment in World War II, to
registration for Iranian students during the Iran Hostage Crisis, national
security-related law enforcement measures often employ racial, religious, or
ethnic profiling to target foreign nationals. Despite numerous historical
lessons, the government's post-September 11 anti-terrorism initiatives are
designed to register, detain, and deport Arab, Muslim, and South Asian
immigrants.
These programs raise numerous civil rights concerns. Racial and
ethnic classifications violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' equal
protection and due process guarantees in most legal contexts. Selective
enforcement of the law based on political and religious affiliation is
traditionally viewed as a violation of the First Amendment. 9 In the criminal
context, even undocumented immigrants are afforded full constitutional
protections, including the ability to raise constitutional challenges to
selective prosecution. 10 But, the Supreme Court has issued such confusing
and contradictory statements about immigrants' rights l that the government
has been able to operate anti-terrorism law enforcement as if the Bill of
Rights does not apply to immigrants when the Executive invokes national
security concerns.

activism with particular political groups. See discussion infra Part IV of the "LA 8" immigrant students
who were arrested and placed in deportation proceedings because of their connections with the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
5
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF SEPTEMBER 11

DETAINEES 12 (August 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us91 l.
6
COLE, supranote 1, at 24-25.
7
See discussion infra Part IV of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 525 U.S.
471 (1999).
8
I use the term "immigrants" in place of the more derogatory legal term "alien." Additionally,
"immigrants" encompasses all those immigration law designates "non-immigrants" (foreign nationals on
temporary visas like student, tourist, or business visas), "legal permanent residents," and "undocumented"
immigrants. All three categories of immigrants have been affected by post-September II anti-terrorism
initiatives, although sometimes in distinct ways which I will explain.
9
COLE, supranote 1, at 204.
10 COLE, supranote 1, at 213 n. 12 (listing cases holding that immigrants are entitled to full
constitutional protections in the criminal context).
I
See discussion infra Part IV regarding Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990);
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); and Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

20051

The Executive's Scapegoat, The Court'sBlind Eye?

By using the immigration context to combat terrorism, the
government has been able to evade important constitutional protections both
for the targets of anti-terrorism law enforcement initiatives and for the press
and public who have been denied access to information about the
government's tactics." Besides the devastating impact on the lives of those
immigrants affected, anti-terrorism law enforcement initiatives could signal a
drastic erosion of the basic rights of all immigrants.
Part I of this paper outlines the political context of anti-immigrant
sentiment and immigration reform that preceded the September 11 terrorist
attacks. Part II describes how the Executive Branch used immigrants as a
scapegoat for the domestic fight against terrorism after September 11. Parts
III and IV constitute an analysis of whether the government's anti-terrorism
law enforcement initiatives affecting immigrants are above constitutional
challenge. This analysis first demonstrates how the present programs follow
directly in the footsteps of previous administrations during times of war and
terrorist threats and how the legal doctrines emerging from constitutional
challenges to those past attacks on immigrants could undermine today's legal
challenges. The second part of this analysis reviews the Supreme Court's
rulings on immigrants' Bill of Rights protections, focusing particularly on
equal protection and freedom of association, to determine whether there is
precedent sufficient to challenge current initiatives. Part V describes how
the post-September 11 anti-terrorism efforts could have a lasting effect on
immigration proceedings because the Executive Branch has obtained judicial
deference to its interpretation of "national security concerns," both in the
context of routine immigration proceedings and secret immigration hearings
for "special interest" detainees. Finally, the conclusion addresses the bearing
of the Supreme Court's June 28, 2004, decisions in Rasul v. Bush, 13 Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 14 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla15 on the constitutionality of domestic
anti-terrorism tactics targeting immigrants.

12

COLE, supranote 1, at 34. See discussion infra Part V regarding North Jersey Media Group v.

Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1046 (2003) (finding secret deportation
hearings constitutional). See infra note 277 (mentioning Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep 't
of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (2003), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (denying public access to information
about special interest detainees)).
13
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
14
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
15
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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I. ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AND IMMIGRATION REFORM

Despite being termed a "nation of immigrants," the United States has
a love-hate relationship with immigration. 16 The United States designed its

original immigration laws to keep out workers deemed a threat to the U.S.
labor force.' 7 The Chinese Exclusion cases, while highly criticized as
motivated by racism, were also rooted in U.S. concern that Chinese
immigrant workers were displacing U.S. workers.' 8 Since then, U.S.
immigration law has alternately admitted and excluded immigrants according
to the need in the labor force. For example, during times of immigration
restriction, such as the National Origins Quota of 1924, instated in response
to anti-communist and socialist fervor after World War I, the United States
allowed in Mexican agricultural workers. 1 9 Perhaps the most notorious
example of the alternate importation and deportation of immigrant workers is
the Bracero Program of the 1940's and 50's, which operated parallel to a
massive immigration law enforcement initiative, Operation Wetback.2 °
These two government projects operated to keep both legal guest workersthe "braceros"-and undocumented workers-the "wetbacks"-captive labor

for U.S. agriculture, because either could be deported at any time.2 '

16

Leo R. Chavez, ImmigrationReform and Nativism, The Nationalist Response to the

TransnationalistChallenge, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
PULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 66 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
17 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 855-56 (1987) (citing an act supplementary to the
acts in relation to immigration, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875); an act to execute certain treaty stipulations
relating to Chinese, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); and an act to prohibit the coming of Chinese persons into
the United States, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892)).
18 Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595-596 (1889). Justice Fields wrote: "In December
1878, the convention which framed the present constitution of California... [set] forth... that the
presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the material interests of the state, and upon public
morals; that their immigration was in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was
a menace to our civilization; that the discontent from this cause was not confined to any political party, or
to any class or nationality, but was well nigh universal; that they retained the habits and customs of their
own country, and in fact constituted a Chinese settlement within the state, without any interest in our
country or its institutions; and praying congress to take measures to prevent their further immigration."
See Henkin, supra note 17, at 863.
19 Juan F. Perea, A BriefHistory of Race and the U.S. Mexican Border: Tracing the Trajectories
of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283, 304 (October 2003).
20 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, BorderlineDecisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, The
New Bracero Programand the Supreme Court's Role in Making FederalLabor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV.
1, 31 (October 2003). See Perea, supra note 19, at 305.
21 Cameron, supra note 20, at 31.
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A. Recent Immigration Reform
Anti-immigrant sentiment arose with the economic ups and downs of
the 1980s and 1990s. 22 Congress responded with immigration reform such as
the terrorist-immigrant profile that motivated anti-terrorism law enforcement
after September 11. To justify changes in the immigration laws, legislators
relied on various myths about the threat immigration poses to the U.S.
economy. The classic story invoked by politicians stated that a flood of
undocumented immigrants would take jobs away from U.S. workers. 23 This
"competition myth," alive today, is rooted in racism and nationalism. 2 4 U.S.
whites fear a non-English speaking, non-white majority because of its effect
on the U.S. economy. 25
In response, Congress created sanctions for employers who hired
undocumented immigrants under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA).26 While placing the ultimate burden on employers to verify
work authorization documents, this provision essentially criminalized the
work of undocumented immigrants. The legislative intent of the IRCA
encompassed the language of the competition myth-to protect American
2 7 Although this experiment failed to
jobs by reducing illegal immigration.
28
reduce levels of immigration, the impact on the immigrant community is
clear: after IRCA, discrimination against Asian Americans and Latinos has
increased.29
22

Chavez, supra note 17, at 67-68; Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old,

Something New, Something Borrowed Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OuT! 165, 173 (Juan F. Perea ed.
1997).
23
Johnson, supranote 22, at 174.
24
Id. at 178-79.
2
Id.
26
Immigration Control and Reform Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1986). The Congressional debate
about IRCA is revealing: "The magnetism of our country is like that of a magnet picking up iron filings as
they rush to come here. I look at a situation where in Matamoros a woman goes into labor and they put
her in a car and rush her across the border to have her child born in the United States. I understand that.
If I were a Mexican citizen and my wife was in labor, I would want her child born in this country too."
132 CONG. REc. S16879-01 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Senator Bentsen). See Chavez, supra
note 16, at 67.
27
"The most conservative estimate I have seen is that 65 percent of those who come into our
country illegally take the jobs of Americans. They take the jobs of low-skilled Americans, generally. In
the city of Chicago, for example, it is estimated-and I do not know how accurate any of these estimates isthat there are 135,000 people who are there illegally. Sixty-five percent means 81,000 jobs for the city of
Chicago. That is a lot ofjobs. Nationally, it is a major problem." 132 CONG. REC. S16879-01 (daily ed.
October 17, 1986) (statement of Senator Simon). See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the
Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Needfor Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345,
357 (2001).
28
See Nessel, supra note 27, at 356.
29

ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 77 (1998)

(reporting that after IRCA, a GAO study found that almost 20% of all employers committed unlawful
discrimination based on national origin or citizenship, and that in another survey of over 400 employers,
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Like Congress, Proponents of Proposition 187 in California
capitalized on the same competition myth narratives as they sought to deny
undocumented immigrant children the right to attend public school and
receive emergency medical care in 1994.30 Similar motivations resulted in
the immigrant provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996,31 which changed the
basic eligibility requirements for welfare benefits, eliminating even legal
immigrants from most programs.32
Finally, concern about economic competition with foreign countries
has also driven anti-immigrant policy. Anti-Japanese rhetoric emerged in
connection with "Buy American" campaigns and debate about "trade wars"
with Japan.33 The 1982 killing of Vincent Chin is a tragic reminder of the
potential 34connection between U.S. foreign policy and local anti-immigrant
violence.
B. Immigrants' Impact on the Economy
While immigrants routinely take the blame for economic problems,
in reality, they form a cornerstone of the U.S. economy. A number of low
wage, high risk job sectors depend largely on undocumented immigrant
labor: manufacturing employs 1.2 million undocumented workers, services
employs 1.3 million, agriculture employs from 1 to 1.4 million, construction
35
employs 600,000, and restaurants employ 700,000 undocumented workers.
These same industries are notorious for violating health, safety, labor, and
wage and hour laws.36 The resulting poverty wages and unsafe working

over half felt it was risky to hire people who spoke limited English, 39% felt it riskier to hire Asians, and
40% felt it riskier to hire Latinos).
30
Johnson, supra note 22, at 177. See Nancy Cervantes, et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in
the Aftermath of Proposition187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1995).
31
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110

Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
32

MICHAEL Fix & JEFFREY PASSEL, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF WELFARE

REFORM'S IMMIGRANT PROVISIONS 7 (2002), at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410412. As a result,
immigrants' receipt of public benefits declined all over the country. Id. at 14.
33
ANCHETA, supra note 29, at 74.
3
Id. Vincent Chin was murdered by two unemployed autoworkers who mistook him for
Japanese. WILLIAM WEI, THE ASIAN AMERICAN MOVEMENT 7 (1993).
35
B. LINDSAY LOWELL & ROBERT SURO, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, How MANY UNDOCUMENTED:
THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE U.S.-MEXICO MIGRATION TALKS 3, 8, at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/site/docspdf/howmanyundocumented.pdf (2002). See NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS: PRESERVING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES AFTER

HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS V. NLRB 1-2 (2003), at www.nelp.org.
36
NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, supra note 35 (reporting, for example, that a U.S.
Department of Labor survey found 100% of all poultry processing plants non-compliant with federal wage
and hour laws in 2000).
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conditions are economic incentives for employers to hire undocumented
immigrants.37
The fear behind the competition myth is an erroneous simplification
of the complicated effect of immigration on the U.S. labor market. As an
Urban Institute report found in 1994, immigrants have minimal overall
negative effect on the availability of U.S. jobs (less than one percent).38 In
small local economies with high immigration during times of economic
recession, some studies have found that new immigrants can affect the wages
of low-skilled black workers (a two to nineteen percent decrease in weekly
earnings depending on study and location), and of other immigrant groups (a
nine to ten percent decrease in wages).39 More specifically, however, studies
showing the largest effects demonstrate that it is a combination of
immigration and trade that most depress the wages of low-skilled U.S.
workers in these areas.4 ° Studies also show that immigrants create more jobs
than they fill by starting new businesses and spending money in the United
States.4' Studies that separate immigrants according to legal status find
either that undocumented immigrants have no negative impact on the job
market for U.S. workers or that they actually increase labor market
opportunities. 42
C. U.S. Policy Drives Immigration
Recent immigration reform based on the competition myth ignores
the push-pull factors driving immigration. Instead of acknowledging the
poverty, war, or environmental disaster forcing immigrants to flee their home
countries, the law emphasizes the "criminal" act of the undocumented worker
- crossing the border and using false papers to obtain a U.S. job. This focus
on the individual conveniently ignores the role of U.S. policy in creating
many of the "push" factors, primarily economic recession and poverty, in
immigrant-sending countries.
The connection between trade policy and immigration from Mexico
is a telling example. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
once touted as a way to improve the economies of all countries involved, was
implemented in 1994 and has not only failed to improve difficult economic
conditions in Mexico, but it has also contributed to loss of earning power for
37

Id.

38

Michael Fix & Jeffrey Passel, URBAN INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETTING

THE RECORD STRAIGHT 49 (1994), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=305184.
39
Id. at 80.
40
Id. at 49.
41
Id. at 47.
42
Id. at81.
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Mexican workers.43 In fact, between 1991 and 1998, wages in Mexico have
decreased by 29% and overall hourly income has decreased by 40%. 44 In
addition, fewer Mexican workers are salaried and more have resorted to selfemployment.45 Consequently, immigration north from Mexico has increased
throughout the 1990's, a clear indicator of decreased employment
opportunities.4 6
NAFTA is also behind job losses for U.S. workers. Every state in
the U.S. has lost jobs due to NAFTA, ranging from 395 in Alaska to 82,354
in California, for a total of 766,030 actual and potential jobs.47 NAFTA has
contributed to wage depression for "unskilled" U.S. workers who constitute
72.7% of the U.S. labor force.4 8 Despite these clear statistics, U.S. policy
makers have blamed foreign workers for these losses instead of U.S. trade
policy.
D. Increase in Immigration Law Enforcement
Immigration law enforcement strategies are driven by the same
nativist fears and misguided policy considerations. Operation Gatekeeper,
instituted in 1994 (at the same time as the implementation of NAFTA), has
involved a massive build-up of immigration law enforcement on the southern
border. 49 Between 1993 and 1997, the INS budget for enforcement at the
southwest border doubled from $400 million to $800 million.50 However,
six out of ten undocumented immigrants have overstayed a visa and have not
crossed the border illegally. 51 Gatekeeper has not only failed to deter illegal
immigration, but has caused a steep increase in the number of migrants who
die each
year attempting to cross the border in more isolated, un-patrolled
52
areas.
43

ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPER, NAFTA AT SEVEN: ITS IMPACT ON WORKERS

IN ALL THREE NATIONS 19 (2001), available at
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers-nafta0
44
Id.at 16.

1/nafta-at-7.pdf.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 14.

47

Id. at 6-7.

48

Id. at 7.

49

Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper,7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

121, 127-128 (2001).
50
Id.at 129 (citing INS FACT SHEET, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: NEW RESOURCES, ENHANCED
RESULTS (July 14, 1998)).

51

Maria Jim~nez, Enforcement: A Tool to Control the Flow of Labor at the U.S.-Mexico Border,

NETWORK NEWS FROM THE NATIONAL NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS (Spring 1997),

availableat http://www.nnirr.org/news/archived netnews/enforcement.htm.
52 Belinda I. Reyes, et al., HOLDING THE LINE? THE EFFECT OF RECENT BORDER BUILD-UP ON
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION 65 (July 2002) (finding no evidence that border enforcement build-up has
substantially reduced unauthorized border crossings and that migrant border deaths increased rapidly after
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After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1996, the image of the Arab,
Muslim, or South Asian terrorist-immigrant emerged as an additional
component of the campaign for immigration reform.5 3 As a result, there were
significant changes to the immigration laws via the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 54 and the Immigrant Responsibility
and Immigration Reform Act (IRAIRA).55 Together, the two statutes
removed significant deportation relief for immigrants with criminal
convictions, regardless of their ties to the United States,56 and expanded the
categories of crimes that could make legal permanent residents deportable
and subject to mandatory detention.57
With this shift in focus to immigration law enforcement the average
daily immigration detention population tripled, rising from 5,532 in 1994 to
19,533 in 2001 and 22,716 in 2003.8 Not all of these detainees are held in
the processing centers of immigration agencies; for example, in 2003 over
sixty percent of immigration detainees were held in local prisons, jails, and
private contract facilities. 59 The harsh impact of these laws has been widely
reported. 6° Initially, the laws were applied retroactively and immigrants with
decade-old convictions and subsequent clean records were deported. 61 Even
employees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement) realized the unjust results.62
Immigrants from countries with poor diplomatic relations with the
United States presented a particularly difficult problem after the 1996 laws
created mandatory detention for "criminal aliens., 63 Immigrants with
criminal convictions making them deportable, whose countries would not
accept them back (for example, immigrants from Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Laos,
the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper, reaching the highest number of deaths in 15 years in FY
2000).
53 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, MigrationRegulation Goes Local: The Role of States in
U.S. Immigration Policy: Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The
Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 322 (2002).
4
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
55 Immigrant Responsibility and Immigration Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
56 See generally Royal F. Berg, Cancellationof Removal for Permanent Resident Aliens, in 199899 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK: BASICS (R. Patrick Murphy, et al. eds., 1999).
57

MARK Dow, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 9 (2004). Criminal

grounds of deportability are encoded at I.N.A. § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227. The definition of "aggravated
felony" is at I.N.A. § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). The mandatory detention provision is I.N.A. §
236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1223(c).
58 Dow, supra note 57, at 9, n.16.
59

Id.

60

See generally Dow, supra note 57.

61 Id.at 190-91. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (halting the retroactive application of
the new laws in cases involving plea bargains made prior to their enactment).
62 Dow, supra note 57, at 191.
63 Id. at 265.
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Cambodia, and Vietnam), were held indefinitely until the Supreme Court
held the practice unconstitutional in 2001.64 Since then, the government has
stepped-up efforts to obtain repatriation agreements from some of these
countries and has begun deporting Cambodians, many of whom spent more
time in immigration detention than in serving their criminal sentences.65
Nativist myths about immigrants have been the driving force behind
U.S. immigration policy, with harsh results for the immigrant community.
Given the political context of at least two decades of anti-immigrant
sentiment and significant immigration law reform, the government's
immediate reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11 was not
surprising.
II. POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TERRORISM LAW ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES
TARGETING IMMIGRANTS

Immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
Administration quickly instituted a number of law enforcement initiatives
designed to root out any potential collaborators poised to carry out additional
attacks.6 s The tactics relied heavily on a profile of the terrorist, namely,
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian immigrant men. The various programs
included: preventative detention, Special Registration, voluntary interviews,
and the Absconder Apprehension Initiative.
A. Preventative Detention
The first government action dispatched federal agents to work in
collaboration with local police and resulted in the arrest of hundreds of Arab,
Muslim, and South Asian men held not on terrorism charges, but on minor
immigration violations.6 7 This "preventative detention" used immigration
law as a pretext for detaining immigrants who fit the government's terrorist
profile because of their perceived race, ethnicity, religion, political
association, or national origin. 68 As one commentator has indicated, "there
were no World War II-style roundups and relocations of American citizens

64
6

66

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See Dow, supra note 57, at 263-84.
DOW, supra note 57, at 263-77.
Lois Romano & David S. Fallis, Questions Swirl Around Men Held in TerrorProbe,

WASHINGTON POST,

October 14, 2001, at AO1.

COLE, supranote 1, at 25.
6
Id. The Migration Policy Institute argued, "The government has essentially used national
origin as a proxy for evidence of dangerousness." MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY
67

INSTITUTE, AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 6 (2003).
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whose ancestry was suspect. But the extensive infrastructure for detention
was in place:" 9 the immigration law enforcement system.
The Department of Justice initially published rising numbers of those
detained under this program, but stopped in November 2001, when the
Department encountered criticism because none of the detainees had been
charged with terrorism. 70 The last number released by the Department stated
that the government had 1,182 detainees. 71 An example of how immigration
law can be used as a pretext for detention for criminal anti-terror law
enforcement purposes is the case of one Palestinian legal permanent resident.
Law enforcement stopped the Palestinian for driving four miles per hour over
the speed limit, took him into custody, and charged him with criminal
sanctions for failing to file a change of address form with the INS.
Ultimately, law enforcement detained him for four months and presumably
investigated the Palestinian for terrorist connections.7 2
Of the individuals preventatively detained after the September 11
attacks, 762 of them are now known as the "September 11 detainees." The
government designated these men "of interest" in the terrorism investigation
and although charged with minor immigration violations, held them in
maximum security for many months even after the resolution of their
immigration cases.73 Using immigration as a pretext allowed the government
to afford the detainees much less protection than they would have in the
criminal context.7 4 The right to counsel, a hearing on probable cause for
detention within 48 hours, a public trial, and other important constitutional
Notably, the USA
safeguards do not apply in the immigration context.
PATRIOT Act 76, passed just weeks after September 11, 2001, includes a
provision for mandatory detention of "suspected alien terrorists., 77 The
government has yet to use this provision; none of the September 11 detainees
were officially designated as such,78 perhaps because immigration law
allowed the government to detain them without having to respect the
constitutional rights usually afforded to criminal suspects.
Before the September 11 terrorism attacks, anti-terrorism law
enforcement initiatives often focused on individual immigrants with some
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demonstrated connection to organizations the U.S. government viewed as
threats to national security. 79 After September 11, the government continued
in this vein, but the more recent law enforcement acts targeted people
assumed to have such connections because of their perceived race, ethnicity,
religion, or nationality (the term used for this approach is selective law
enforcement).8 ° Preventative detention affected immigrants who had no
particular political affiliation to terrorist groups; law enforcement justified
the arrests on possible associations.8 '
The scarce information available concerning selective law
enforcement techniques employed by the government in order to select the
"September 11 detainees" for arrest raises First Amendment and equal
protection concerns. 82 After researching the post-September 11 antiterrorism law enforcement initiatives, a Human Rights Watch report stated,
"Our research, press accounts, and research by other organizations suggest..
. that the 'indications' that triggered questioning and subsequent arrest in
many cases may have been little more than a form of profiling on the basis of
nationality, religion, and gender. '83 As an example, the report detailed that
police investigated two men because a bystander reported they stopped to
kneel and pray in a parking lot in Texas City, Texas. 84 The men were then
arrested for having a knife and driver's licenses that the police suspected
were to be altered.89
Even elements within the government became concerned about the
law enforcement response to September 11. FBI agent Coleen Rowley
publicly criticized the FBI's intelligence failures, but she also denounced
preventative detention:
The vast majority of the one thousand plus persons "detained" in
the wake of 9-11 did not turn out to be terrorists. They were
mostly illegal aliens . . .[A]fter 9-11, Headquarters encouraged
more and more detentions for what seemed to be essentially PR
purposes. Field officers were required to report daily the number
of detentions in order to supply grist for statements on our progress
in fighting terrorism ...[Plarticular vigilance may be required to
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head off undue pressure (including subtle encouragement) to
detain or "round up" suspects, particularly those of Arabic origin. 86
The U.S. government itself has provided even more information
showing the use of selective enforcement within the post-September 11 law
enforcement initiatives. The Office of Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of Justice issued the government's own report evaluating the
detention conditions of the September 11 detainees.87 The report stated that
law enforcement made arrests based on "anonymous tips called in by
members of the public suspicious of Arab and Muslim neighbors who kept
odd schedules., 88 The government designated the arrestees "of interest",
"whether or not the alien turned out to have a connection to the September 11
attacks or any other terrorist activity..
General political statements
sometimes served as a basis to not only investigate an immigrant, but also to
arrest and indefinitely detain him: "A Muslim man in his 40's . . . was

arrested after an acquaintance wrote a letter to law enforcement officers
stating that the man had made anti-American statements. The statements, as
reported in the letter, were very general and did not involve threats of
violence or suggest any direct connection to terrorism.' 90 The government
arrested him for overstaying his visa and placed him in the "special interest"
category. 9 1
The preventative detention initiative has proved ineffective in
finding terrorists. As a result of all the government's various anti-terrorism
measures, an estimated 5000 people have been detained. 92 Of those detained,
the government has failed to charge them with any crimes related to
September 11; in fact, the government charged only three non-citizens and
two citizens (held on material witness warrants) with terrorist-related
crimes.93 Of those five charged, two were acquitted, one was convicted of
conspiracy to support terrorism, one in exchange with the government
dismissing terrorism charges pleaded to a minor violation, and one awaits
trial. 94 Effectiveness aside, such broad law enforcement sweeps targeting
immigrants based on perceived political or religious affiliation can only be
constitutional if immigrants have no First Amendment rights and if selective
86
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enforcement
based on racial and ethnic identity is legal in the immigration
95
context.
B. Special Registration
Implemented by the Department of Justice, Special Registration
comes in two forms. The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
(NSEERS) requires new non-immigrants from certain countries to be
fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed upon entry. They must be
interviewed each year and notify the Bureau of Citizenship96and Immigration
Service (BCIS, formerly INS) when they leave the country.
Special Call-In Registration affected non-immigrants already in the
country. 9 Beginning in 2002, BCIS called into its office four groups of men
aged sixteen and older from twenty-five countries (mostly Arab and
Muslim). 98 The men were interviewed about their religious beliefs, marital
status, reasons for being in the United States, family members in the United
States and elsewhere, entry to the United States, and school or employer. 99
BCIS fingerprinted and performed a criminal background check on each
man. If there were no problems with the individual's visa, and he had no
criminal convictions, BCIS released him.1°° Otherwise, officials took the
individual to another room, interrogated him further, and sometimes detained
him overnight.10 1 If they had an outstanding warrant or deportation order,
BCIS detained and deported the non-immigrant. 10 2 If they had some other
more minor visa violation, BCIS released the individual
and he later received
0 3
a Notice to Appear for deportation proceedings.
Around 82,000 men complied with the "call-in" registration;' 4 BCIS
detained 2,747 men and about one-sixth of them have received deportation
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orders. 105 Most of those deported were of Pakistani origin.' 06 The Brooklyn,
New York, Pakistani community has reportedly been reduced by forty
percent, because the members were either detained or deported or left the
country voluntarily as a result of this program.'0 7 The registration arguably
involved various due process and equal protection violations in its
implementation.108 The government published the notice only in the Federal
Register and the BCIS website, and the government erroneously translated
the information in some languages.1°9 Registrants did not have interpreters
and were not allowed access to counsel." 0 The conditions the registrants
withstood involved intimidation and yelling, day-long lines, overcrowding,
detention with no access to food or water, and no chance to observe religious
practices. "'
Through the Special Registration Program, the government did not
apprehend anyone connected with the September 11 terrorist attacks." 2 In
March 2003, the Department of Homeland Security reported that they had3
identified eight suspected terrorists, but as of yet, no one has been charged."
The Department eventually announced that the government had ended parts
of the Special Registration program and would no longer require a second
registration or check-in4 from new entrants or those who registered through
the "call-in" program."
C. Voluntary Interviews
In November 2001, the Department of Justice began interviewing 1a5
list of five thousand immigrant men from Arab and Muslim countries.
The Department justified the list of countries as those with demonstrated
support for Al Queda, but did not include Great Britain, Germany or Spain,
105
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although Al Queda suspects have been captured in those countries.' 6 In
March 2002, the Department started on another list of three thousand men,
again'basing the selection on age, date of entry to the U.S., and Arab or
Muslim country of origin.'17 The United States also instituted a twenty-day
waiting period on visas for men between ages sixteen and forty-five from the
same Arab and Muslim countries! 18 The Department arrested fewer than 20
of the interviewees on immigration charges and none on terrorism charges' 1 9
D. Absconder Apprehension Initiative
According to the Department of Justice, there are currently 314,000
"absconders" living in the United States-people who have final orders of
removal or deportation but who have not left the country. 2 ° Out of this
group, the U.S. Deputy Attorney General has prioritized six thousand Arabs
and Muslims to be apprehended and deported.' 2 ' By May 2003, the
government had detained 1,100 people, 122 using the immigration
system to
23
practice selective enforcement based on race and ethnicity.
III. ABOVE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE?
The government initiatives outlined above are strikingly similar-perhaps
modeled after-law enforcement programs instituted in response to
international conflict in the past. A review of this checkered history reveals
how immigrants' rights are routinely ignored in the face of national
insecurity, and how, when courts are asked to intervene, fundamental aspects
of the U.S. legal system support judges' decisions to step aside.
A. World War I
The Alien Act of 1798 gave the U.S. President the power to deport
124
any non-citizen he determined to be dangerous, without judicial review.
At the time of its passage, the government used the Act against Irish
Catholics. 25 During World War I, the government used the Act to arrest
116
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6,300 German-Americans labeled "enemy aliens."' 1 26 The government
incarcerated 2,048 German nationals in enemy camps without any criminal
own guns, radios, or
charges. 27 German men over fourteen could 12not
8
explosives and had to register at U.S. post offices.
Soon after the war, in the midst of massive efforts to organize
workers and the general strikes of 1919, terrorists mailed thirty-six small
bombs to prominent U.S. citizens around the country. 129 One of the bombs
exploded on the doorstep of the house of the U.S. Attorney General, A.
Mitchell Palmer, while still in the hands of the bomb-thrower, an anarchist
Italian immigrant. 30 The government blamed the terrorist incident on
anarchist, communist, and socialist groups, which triggered an attack on
leftists; this attack became known as the Red Scare.' 3 1 Despite the fact that
the majority of members of the anarchist, communist, and socialist left could
be classified as non-violent, the Attorney General launched a law
enforcement initiative primarily targeting Jewish and Italian immigrants with
suspicious political affiliations. 132 To justify the raids, Palmer used the Alien
Control Act of 1918, which provided that "aliens" advocating overthrow of
the U.S. government should be excluded from the country. 33 The
34
government interrogated, arrested, and detained over 10,000 i'migrans.
To force confessions, government officials beat many of the immigrants.
This resulted in the deportation of over five hundred individuals. 36 The
the government
government uncovered no explosives or plots to overthrow
37
and found no one to be a threat to the United States.
Eventually, federal judges began to throw out evidence gathered
during the Palmer Raids because of civil liberties violations so the detainees
could not be prosecuted criminally. 38 The Secretary of Labor, in charge of
immigration at the time, also began to throw out warrants and release the
detainees. 139 However, the Raids had a lasting impact on the country's
perception of the immigrant communities, which soon expressed itself in
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immigration law. In 1924, Congress passed quotas, limiting immigration to
two percent of a country's U.S. population in 1890.'40 This had a disparate
effect on newer immigrants, which was the same communities targeted in the
Raids for their political leanings. As a consequence, immigration from
eastern and southern Europe decreased by ninety-seven percent. 4 1
B. World War H
Japanese internment during World War II is perhaps the most
infamous example of racial and ethnic profiling for national security. In
1942, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order directing the army to
evacuate, relocate, and intern 110,000 people of Japanese ancestry; twothirds of those interned held the status of U.S. citizen. 42 In addition to
internment, Congress passed the Alien Registration Act, known as the Smith
Act, requiring all "resident aliens" over the age of fourteen to register and be
fingerprinted. 43 President Roosevelt also used the Enemy Alien Act, passed
at the same time as the Alien Act of 1798, to declare that
the government
44
could detain "enemy aliens" and confiscate their property.'
In three well-known cases, the Supreme Court upheld Japanese
internment. 145 The Court agreed that classifications based on race and
ethnicity merit strict scrutiny, but deferred to the government's decision that
internment was necessary for national security. 146 Despite the fact that these
cases have been widely criticized, even by the Court itself, the cases' main
holdings have never been explicitly overturned.
C. The Iran Hostage Crisis
The day after the Iran Hostage Crisis began, President Carter and the
U.S. Attorney General instated a program that required all non-immigrant
post-secondary students of Iranian nationality to register with local
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) offices.' 4 Some students
sued, claiming violation of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
140
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Amendment.1 48 The D.C. Circuit upheld the program. 49 The court applied
rational basis scrutiny because the federal government has broad immigration
powers.15 ° The government has the ability to make distinctions based on
national origin as long as the reason is not irrational. 51 The court also
deferred to the Executive, stating that the court could not cast judgment on
decisions made within the President's foreign affairs power, in this
52 case, his
Crisis.
Hostage
the
end
to
efforts
diplomatic
in
efforts to engage
D. FundamentalDoctrines
Two doctrines fundamental to our legal system have been repeatedly
invoked as courts refuse to intervene in government attacks on immigrants in
times of national insecurity: the plenary nature of Congress' Immigration
Power and judicial deference to the Executive power.
In 1889, the Supreme Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion laws,
declaring that the federal government's power to control immigration
53
"flow[ed] from no other legitimate source" than that of its independence.
Implicit in the statement is that power inherent in the nation's sovereignty
can not be subject to other constitutional limitations such as the Bill of
Rights. 54 This "plenary" immigration power has been used to support
statutes targeting immigrants during times of national insecurity. 155 For
example, in 1952, the Supreme Court upheld the Alien Registration Act
against constitutional challenge, stating,
War, of course, is the most usual occasion for extensive resort to
the [Government's power to terminate its hospitality]. Though the
resident alien may be personally loyal to the United States, if his
nation becomes our enemy, his allegiance prevails over his
personal preference and makes him also our enemy, liable to
expulsion or internment, and his property becomes subject to
seizure and perhaps confiscation. But it does not require war to
bring the power of deportation into existence or to authorize its
exercise. Congressional apprehension156of foreign or internal
dangers short of war may lead to its use.
148 Id.
149
150
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152 Id. at 748.
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Another clear historical pattern in times of war is that of the
Judiciary deferring to the Executive. 157 This is most clear in the "war cases,"
in which military service men and women and members of Congress have
asked the courts to intervene when they believe the President has
overstepped his bounds in committing U.S. troops. 15 8 Overwhelmingly, the
courts have refused to hear the cases, arguing the political question doctrine
makes the cases nonjusticiable. 159 Obviously, asking a court to decide how
government anti-terrorism initiatives may have affected civil liberties here in
the United States is vastly different from asking a court to decide the
difference between "war" and "use of force" in a foreign country. However,
the political question doctrine, so quickly applied in the war cases, also rears
its head in the immigration cases. In Narenji, the D.C. Circuit stated, "The
reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a
narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the
President in the area of immigration and naturalization."'6 And in upholding
the Alien Registration Act, the Supreme Court wrote,
It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally
and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters
are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.161
As the Court indicates here, the war power and the plenary immigration
power could insulate national security initiatives targeting immigrants from
judicial review.16 The legal results of the history of government action
Ofer, supra note 106.
158 Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003) (U.S. presence in Iraq); Campbell v. Clinton, 203
F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 815 (2000) (U.S. presence in Yugoslavia); Dellems v.
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (U.S. presence in Iraq); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355
(1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (U.S. presence in El Salvador). Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484
F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,416 U.S. 936 (1974) (U.S. presence in Cambodia).
157
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161 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
162 David Cole argues that the plenary power has been both discredited and limited in recent years.
In a 2001 Supreme Court case, Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court rejected the government's argument that
plenary power afforded the right to indefinitely detain immigrants with criminal convictions who had been
found deportable but could not be returned to their countries of origin. COLE, supra note 1, at 223
(referring to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)). See CHISrrTI ET AL., supra note 68, at 48. The
Court stated that plenary power was "subject to important constitutional limitations," which applied in this
case. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. However, the opinion left open the possibility that these limitations
could be suspended in times of national insecurity by mentioning that it would not "consider terrorism or
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targeting immigrants in wartime casts doubt on whether post-September 11
programs would be found unconstitutional.
IV. IMMIGRANTS' BILL OF RIGHTS PROTECTIONS

In their similarity to government action in past wars, and in the face
of courts' reluctance to intervene, the post-September 11 anti-terror
initiatives targeting immigrants appear beyond constitutional challenge.
However, after the civil rights movement, the Bill of Rights has sharper teeth
than ever before, especially where racial and ethnic classifications are
concerned. An analysis of immigrants' status under the Bill of Rights
reveals precedent to argue the government has violated immigrants' rights
after September 11. The courts, however, have left open many questions as
to whether the government can proceed as though immigrants have no rights.
Immigrants' rights are constantly in tension with the "plenary"
nature of the immigration power. But in the same era as the Chinese
Exclusion cases, the Supreme Court also ruled that the Bill of Rights does
apply to immigrants. In 1886, the Court decided the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment covers non-citizens. 6 3 Ten years later, the
Court struck down a statute that sentenced deportable immigrants to one year
of hard labor and held that immigrants with a final order of deportation are
entitled to criminal due process protections.164 At times the Court has
explicitly stated that legal permanent residents are entitled to Bill of Rights
protections. 165 And all immigrants, regardless
of status, are granted full due
166
process rights in the criminal justice system.
In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has issued a confusing
range of statements on immigrants' Bill of Rights protections, failing to
garner a majority on any clear rule. In 1990, in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
immigrants and therefore, did not require the suppression of evidence from a
other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and
for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national
security." Id. at 696. Furthermore, since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Court has retreated from
Zadvydas in Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim by upholding a 1996 statute mandating detention without bond
of immigrants with criminal convictions during immigration proceedings, again limiting immigrants' due
process rights. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). See Michael Patrick, Detention
Without Bond, 229 New York Law Journal 3 (May 28, 2003). See discussion in Part IV.
163 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See COLE, supra note 1, at 220 (2003). This
holding was reaffirmed in relation to undocumented immigrants in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
MA Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
165 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596, 598 n.5 (1953) (holding that a lawful
permanent resident is a person within the meaning of the First and Fifth Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (concurring opinion by Justice Murphy stating that legal immigrants are
protected by the First and Fifth Amendments, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
166 COLE, supra note 1, at 213 (listing cases).
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warrantless search by U.S. agents of a Mexican national's property in
Mexico. 167 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, said the use of the
term "the people" in the Fourth Amendment limited its protection to "a class
of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be part of that
community."'168 The Chief Justice did state, however, that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment criminal protections were more broadly applicable
because
169
those amendments contain the words "person" and "accused."
Recently, the Court has considered the due process rights of
immigrants in deportation proceedings. In 2001, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the
Court rejected the government's argument that plenary power afforded the
right to indefinitely detain immigrants with criminal convictions who had
been found deportable but could not be returned to their countries of
origin. 170 The Court stated that plenary power is "subject to important
constitutional limitations."' 171 The government argued that immigrants lack a
substantial liberty interest. Because the immigrants had been found
deportable, their liberty interest had been "greatly diminished by their lack of
a legal right to live at large in this country." 172 The Court rejected the notion
that lack of immigration status allows the government to completely
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1990).
168 Id. at 265. In support, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Turnerv. ex rel. Williams, 194 U.S. 279
(1904), a case involving a First Amendment challenge by an immigrant in deportation proceedings,
implying that the language of the First Amendment would similarly limit its protection. He distinguished
cases holding that immigrants are entitled to the Bill of Rights by stating those cases "establish only that
aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and
developed substantial connections with this country," and emphasized that whether undocumented
immigrants were protected by the Fourth Amendment was an unsettled question. Id. at 272-73. The
Chief Justice minimized INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), in which "a majority of Justices
assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United States," stating that the case
should be limited to its facts and that the decision was "not dispositive of how the Court would rule on a
Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such a claim were squarely before us."
Id. Some commentators have interpreted Verdugo-Urquidez to say that undocumented immigrants do not
have First and Fourth Amendment rights. Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition,78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 680 (2003). Justice Brennan's dissent in the case also interpreted the majority's
decision this way: "In this discussion the Court implicitly suggests that the Fourth Amendment may not
protect illegal aliens in the United States. Numerous lower courts, however, have held that illegal aliens
in the United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, and not a single lower court has held to the
contrary" (citations omitted). Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 783 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Other
commentators have emphasized that the fifth vote for the final holding, Justice Kennedy, concurred but
specifically rejected this notion. COLE, supra note 1, at 213 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 27677 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). And still others point out that Rehnquist's language appears to condition
protection of the Fourth Amendment on ties to the "national community" rather than immigration status.
Maryam Karnali Miyamoto, The FirstAmendment After Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens? 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 186 n.13 (2000).
169 Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1990).
170 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See COLE, supra note 1, at 223; CHISIr ET AL.,
167

supra note 68, at 48.
171 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (2001).
172
Id. at 696.
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disrespect the right to liberty: "[W]e believe that an alien's liberty interest is,
at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to whether,
irrespective of the procedures used, the
' 73Constitution permits detention that is
indefinite and potentially permanent.'
The Court has since retreated from this decision. In 2003, in
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, the Court upheld a 1996 statute mandating
preventative detention without bond of immigrants with criminal convictions
during immigration proceedings. 74 David Cole writes that this decision
"marks the first time outside of a war setting that the Court has upheld
preventative detention of anyone without an individualized assessment of the
necessity of such detention."'' 75 The Court justified the ruling by stating that
the immigration power allowed Congress to make "rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens." 176 This decision indicates the Court's
willingness to allow certain governmental interests to outweigh Bill of
Rights protections afforded to immigrants.
The Constitution's equal
protection clause and guarantee of freedom of association hold the most
promise for a challenge to the government's post September 11 law
enforcement techniques targeting immigrants.
A. Equal Protection
Classifications based on race and ethnicity merits the highest judicial
scrutiny, requiring justification with a compelling state interest. 177 However,
the Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection doctrine, as
applied to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment, requires
only a rational or reasonable justification for classifications based on
immigration status and national origin.178 This doctrine upheld the Iranian
student registration program in 1979 in Narenji v. Civiletti.179 The Migration
Policy Institute argues that Narenji is distinguishable from other national
security-related government initiatives targeting immigrants, like post
September 11 Special Registration, because the program had a clear national
origin focus, while current initiatives purport
to use national origin, but in
180
ethnicity.
or
race
on
more
rely
actuality

173

Id.

Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). See Patrick, supra note 162, at 3.
COLE, supra note 1, at 224 (emphasis in original).
176 Demore, 538 U.S. at 547 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
177 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
178 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225
(1982). See COLE, supranote 1, at 221.
179 See discussion infra Part I regarding Narenji v. Civiletti.
180 CHISHT ET AL., supra note 68, at 140.
174
175
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Challenging the selective law enforcement practiced after September
11 on this distinction would require extensive documentation of the role of
the racial and ethnic profile used by law enforcement agents. One must
attempt to show that national origin and immigration are the primary factors
employed to arrest and detain individuals. Deliberately, such information
has been kept from the public eye. 81 The government's use of the
immigration system is a brilliant tactical decision which could put
preventative detention, Special Registration, voluntary interviews, and the
Absconder Apprehension Initiative beyond equal protection challenge.
Despite the civil rights movement's great strides in strengthening the
Constitution's protections for racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants' rights
still come into conflict with the federal government's ultimate ability to
define the national community. Furthermore, if it is established that the
government's "terrorist" profile is based on race and ethnicity instead of
immigration status or national origin, Korematsu and Hirabayashi
to
demonstrate that even when race or ethnic classifications are subjected
82
strict scrutiny, national security is the ultimate "compelling interest.',
B. FirstAmendment Rights
Congress has routinely used the immigration power to target foreign
nationals based on their political associations in times of national insecurity,
with the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), 183 the Alien Registration Act (1940)
(also known as the Smith Act), 84 the McCarran-Walter Act (1952),85 the

181

See discussion infra Part IV regarding North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198

(3d Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (May 27, 2003) (finding secret deportation hearings
constitutional), and note 277 mentioning Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331
F.3d 918 (2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (denying public access to information about special
interest detainees).
182 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
183 The Alien Act of 1798 gave the President the power to deport non-citizens without judicial
review. It was never enforced. The Sedition Act criminalized criticism of the government. COLE, supra
note 1, at 91.
184 Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 670,54 Stat. 670, Title Ill, §§ 30-31 (1940). The
Act allowed for deportation of immigrants who engaged in advocacy in opposition to organized
government. Susan Dente Ross, In the Shadow of Terror:The Illusive FirstAmendment Rights of Aliens,
6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 76, 85 (2001); COLE, supra note 1, at 131.
185 McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. 108-198, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The McCarran-Walter Act
added Communism to the list of ideologies that could make an immigrant deportable and excludable.
COLE, supra note 1, at 131. In 1989, a federal district court held the McCarran-Walter Act
unconstitutional under the First Amendment in American-ArabAnti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714
F.Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affid in part and rev'd in part, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1992). In 1990,
Congress repealed the Act and instead made terrorism a deportable offense. COLE, supra note 1, at 165166; Ross, supranote 184.
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Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996),186 and the USA
PATRIOT Act (2001).187 Immigrants who came under the purview of these
statutes have repeatedly brought First Amendment challenges to their
deportation, denaturalization, or exclusion. The Supreme Court's decisions
on these challenges are reactionary--consistently responding to the political
context rather than dictating clear rules to balance immigrants' First
Amendment rights with Congress' immigration power. The result is a
doctrinal confusion that allows the current government to act as if
immigrants have no First Amendment rights. It also raises the question of
whether the courts will intervene in anti-terrorism law enforcement
initiatives targeting immigrants based on perceived religious and political
associations.
C. A Hierarchyof Rights?
The first challenge to an immigration law targeting foreign nationals
based on political association did not fare well. The 1903 Immigration Act
excluded "anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow of
the United States or of all government or of all forms of law."18 The law
survived a First Amendment challenge in Turner v. Williams, in which the
Supreme Court upheld the deportation of a British national who had given
89
speeches advocating a general strike and declaring his-self an anarchist.1
The Court rejected the argument that to exclude all anarchist immigrants is
unconstitutional because not all anarchists advocate violence. 19° Instead the
Court deferred to Congress' decision that "the general exploitation of such
views is so dangerous to the public weal that aliens who hold and advocate
them would be undesirable additions to our population."'19 1 The Court also
the
explained that an undocumented immigrant "does not become one of
192
people to whom [the First Amendment is] secured by our Constitution."'
In the 1940s, however, the Court explicitly recognized that
immigrants have First Amendment rights to political association. First, the
Court ensured that naturalized citizens have the same First Amendment
rights as the native-born, striking "a real, decisive, and public blow in favor

18
187
188

189
190
191

192

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 284 (1904).

Id. at 283, 292.
Id.

Id. at 294.

Id. at 292. See Ross, supra note 184, at 116.
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of immigrants' rights. '' 193 In Schneiderman v. United States, the Court struck
down the government's attempt to denaturalize a U.S. citizen because he
classified himself as Communist, years after being granted citizenship. 94
The Court rejected the government's argument that Schneiderman, as a
Communist, illegally procured his citizenship because he had not "attached
to the principles of the Constitution" at his naturalization. 95 The Court set a
high standard for the government to meet in order to denaturalize an
immigrant who has obtained U.S. citizenship: the burden is to prove "by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.., that petitioner obtained his
citizenship illegally."'196 In this case, the Court had doubt about whether
Schneiderman's beliefs represented "agitation and exhortation calling for
present violent action which creates a clear and present danger of public
disorder," which would allow denaturalization, or "mere doctrinal
justification or prediction of the use of force under hypothetical conditions at
some indefinite future time," which would not. t 97 Because of this doubt, the
Court determined the government had not met its burden. 98
Soon after Schneiderman, the Court issued a similarly strong
statement about the First Amendment rights of legal permanent residents.
The Court decided Bridges v. Wixon, reversing a lower court decision to
deport Bridges for Communist party membership under the 1940 Alien
Registration Act.' 99 "Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens
residing in this country," the Court declared.2 °° It decided that Congress had
not meant "affiliation" with Communism to "cast so wide a net as to reach
those whose ideas and program, though coinciding with the legitimate aims
of such groups, nevertheless fall short of overthrowing the government by
force and violence., 20 ' In balancing Bridges' First Amendment rights
against the government's national security concerns, the Court decided the
right to free speech sufficiently strong to outweigh the government's attempt
to deport him. 2
The Court did not consistently interpret immigrants' First
Amendment rights expansively. In the midst of the McCarthy Era, ten years
193 David Fontana, A Casefor the Twenty-First Century ConstitutionalCanon:Schneiderman v.
United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 81-83 (2002). See Miyamoto, A Different Bill of Rights, supra note 168,
at 196.
194
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). See Fontana, supra note 193, at 35.
195 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 136; Fontana, supra note 193, at 43.
1' Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 157-58 (internal citations omitted); Fontana, supra note 193, at 48.
197

Id.

198

Id.

199 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); COLE, supra note 1,at 132-135; Ross, supranote 184,

at 117.

200

Id.
201 Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147-48; Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 198.
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Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 198-99; Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161.
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later, the Court upheld the deportation of legal permanent residents for past
Communist Party membership under the Alien Registration Act, even
allowing the law to be applied retroactively to deport immigrants who had
been members of the party when it was legal to join.2 °3 The Court relied on
Dennis v. United States, in which it upheld the criminalization of certain
political associations advocating the overthrow of government by force or
violence.20 " While some commentators suggest these cases represent the
Court's final statement on the First Amendment rights of immigrants, others
point out that the Court applied the same "clear and present danger" test to
the statutory provisions that applied in deportation as those that applied in
the criminal context, indicating that the rights are the same. 20 5 At least, as
Susan Dente Ross has written, "These cases suggest that the
206 Court has not
aliens."
for
rights
constitutional
of
scale
the
on
point
fixed a
It is important to note that all of the cases discussed above, with the
exception of Turner v. Williams and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,2 °7
involved immigrants who had lawfully entered the country and received
legal resident status. Immigrants never officially granted status, such as
those who cross the border illegally, might be more analogous to those facing
exclusion from the country. But, exclusion based on political affiliation has
been challenged under the First Amendment, to no avail. In 1972, the Court
upheld the U.S. government's refusal to grant a visa to Ernst Mandel, a
Marxist Belgian national.20 8 Professors of U.S. citizenship brought suit,
asserting their own First Amendment rights to associate with Mandel had
been violated by the McCarran-Walter Act, which allowed the Attorney
General to exercise discretion to exclude immigrants based on their political
beliefs. 20 9 The Court held the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights did not
extend so far as to require granting the visa. 210 The Court also made clear
that "Mandel, personally, as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no
constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or
otherwise. ,21 1 While the decision could be used to represent the notion that
203 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); COLE,
supranote 1, at 136; Ross, supra note 184, at 117.
204 Harisiades,342 U.S. at 592 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)); Miyamoto,
supranote 168, at 201.
205 Miyamoto, supranote 168, at 201 (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of

Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 869 (1989)).
206

Ross, supra note 184, at 118.

207 Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 254, 279 (1990) (Stevens J, concurring and
arguing that Respondent was lawfully present in the United States "even though he was brought and held
here against his will" and therefore is "among those 'people' who are entitled to the protection of the Bill
of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment").
208 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
Id. at 755, 760; Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 196-97.
20
210 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769-70.
211
Id. at 762.
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an undocumented immigrant would be in the same position as Mandel,
having never been lawfully admitted, the Court's language, with an emphasis
on residence, does not completely foreclose constitutional protection to
undocumented immigrants.
One possible interpretation of the Court's doctrinal confusion as to
the First Amendment rights of immigrants is that there is a hierarchy of
rights depending on one's immigration status.2 12 Naturalized citizens have
similar rights to those of native-born citizens. Legal permanent residents are
less protected when associating with groups the United States sees as a
threat. Undocumented immigrants may have no protections, possibly
depending on the extent of their connection to the country.
The 1996 re-definition of entry to the United States in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (HRAIRA) 213 could
expand this latter category of those without protection. Before IRAIRA,
immigrants who entered the country, regardless of the legality of their entry,
became subject to deportation proceedings (and therefore, more rights)
instead of exclusion proceedings, which had been limited to those who had
not yet entered.21 4 After IIRAIRA, those lawfully admitted are subject to
what is now called removal proceedings, and all others, illegal entrants and
those seeking entry, are subject to exclusion proceedings. 21 5 This means two
undocumented immigrants, one who crossed the border illegally, and one,
who overstayed a visa, might be subject to different procedures, and
therefore, have different rights.
While immigrants have repeatedly been subject to statutes providing
for deportation based on association, as in the cases outlined above, more
recently the government has changed tactics. The new strategy still involves
targeting immigrants based on political affiliations, but the government uses
routine immigration violations as the basis for deportation. Selective
prosecution is unconstitutional in the criminal context, but may be allowed in
immigration proceedings.
D. Selective Enforcement of Immigration Laws Based on PoliticalAffiliation
A fairly recent Supreme Court decision could preclude immigrants
from bringing claims of selective enforcement of the immigration laws based
212
213

Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 185.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat.

3009-546 (1996).
214

AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE TREATISE,

IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 297 (2002).
215

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2004) (defining "admission" as lawful entry); FRAGOMEN & BELL,

IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 213.

2005]

The Executive's Scapegoat, The Court's Blind Eye?

on affiliations traditionally protected by the First Amendment. In 1999, the
Court decided its first case addressing the conflict between the First
Amendment and the plenary immigration power in the terrorism context.216
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee spanned three
different Congressional attempts to provide for deportation of immigrants
based on affiliations traditionally protected by the First Amendment: the
McCarran-Walter Act, the Immigration Act of 1990, and the IIRAIRA of
1996. Known as the "LA 8," the plaintiffs were politically active Palestinian
students: two legal permanent residents, and six non-immigrants on
temporary visas.21
The government claimed the students qualified as
national security risks because they associated with the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine.21 8 The government arrested the students, placed
them in deportation proceedings, and charged them under the McCarranWalter Act provision that allowed for the deportation of members of a
Communist organization.21 9
When they challenged the selective
enforcement based on the right to political association guaranteed by the
First Amendment, the government changed its tactics, charging the nonimmigrants with minor visa violations and the legal permanent residents
under another section of the Act making an immigrant deportable for
associating with a group
advocating destruction of property and attacks on
220
government officials.
When the Court designated the McCarran-Walter
Act
22
unconstitutional based on the LA 8's initial challenge, ' Congress repealed
it and passed the Immigration Act of 1990, making immigrants deportable
for having "engaged in terrorist activity. '222 Capitalizing on the new
legislation, the government again changed the charges against the legal
permanent resident members of the LA 8, charging them with providing
financial support to a terrorist organization.22 3 The group members
continued to challenge their deportation, claiming their arrests amounted to
selective enforcement, unconstitutionally based on activities protected by the
First Amendment. 224 The Ninth Circuit agreed, declaring that non-citizens
living in the United States have the same First Amendment rights as citizens,
216
217
218
219
220

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
COLE, supra note 1, at 162-63; CHISHT1 ET AL., supra note 68, at 140-41.
COLE, supra note 1, at 162-63; CHISHI ET AL., supra note 68, at 141.
Id.
COLE, supra note 1, at 164; CHISHn Er AL., supra note 68, at 141; American-Arab Anti-

Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 1995).
221 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (C.D.Cal.
1989), affid in part and rev'd in part, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1992).
222 COLE, supra note 1, at 165-166; CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 68, at 141; Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 358, 104 Stat. 4978; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C).
223 COLE, supra note 1, at 166; CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 68, at 142.
224
Id.
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and held that selective prosecution of the immigration laws is
unconstitutional.22 5
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on the case, limited to a
jurisdictional issue created by the IIRAIRA which significantly limited
judicial review over pending deportation cases: the Attorney General argued
IIRAIRA eliminated federal court jurisdiction over the LA 8's selective
enforcement claims.2 26 The Court held that the IIRAIRA did bar the federal
courts from reviewing such claims.227 However, despite holding the Court
had no jurisdiction to hear the claim, Justice Scalia's opinion reached the
merits of the immigrants' selective enforcement claim. He stated that "When
an alien's continuing presence in this country is in violation of the
immigration laws, the Government does not offend the Constitution by
deporting him for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member
of an organization that supports terrorist activity., 228 Justice Scalia implied
that undocumented immigrants have no First Amendment rights. 229 The
decision is to some degree predicated on the idea that the constitutional
challenges to deportation proceedings would simply be postponed until an
immigrant has a final order of removal-but appellate review of
administrative proceedings are limited to the record, which then would not
include facts about the constitutional challenge.23 ° Scalia did not seem
bothered by this "catch-22, ''2 31 instead clearly stating:
"As a general
matter-and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in
the present case-an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional
232
right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation."
Justice Scalia's decision could have broad consequences for
immigrants' First Amendment rights.2 33 The potential impact of his
22
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995). See Reno
v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 at 475; COLE, supranote 1, at 167; CHISHTI
ET AL., supra note 68, at 142.
226
Reno, 525 U.S. at 475-76; COLE, supra note 1, at 167; CHISHTI ET AL.,supra note 68, at 142;

Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 203-06.
227
Reno, 525 U.S. at 486-87; COLE, supra note 1, at 167; CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 68, at 142;
Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 203-06.
2n
Reno, 525 U.S. at 491-92.
2N
CHisHTi ET AL., supra note 68, at 142; Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 204-05.

M

Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 206 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A): "[T]he court of appeals

shall decide the petition only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based.")
231
Id. (citing Margaret M. Russell, If Legal Immigrants Can Be Deemed "Illegal" Justfor
Exercising Their Rights, Who Among Us Is Safe, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at B7).
232
Reno, 525 U.S. at 488.
233 Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion attempted to limit the reach of the decision. She
emphasized that immigrants do have First Amendment rights and implied the same standards applied to a

selective prosecution claim in a criminal proceeding might also be applied to a deportation proceeding.
Reno, 525 U.S. at 497-98 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). She also expressed discomfort with the majority
opinion reaching the merits of the First Amendment claim when the Court was not briefed on the issue.
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statements is unclear, however, even for the LA 8, since two were legal
permanent residents targeted for their political associations: not an
"additional reason," but the sole reason for their deportation.234 Like the
Court's previous immigrant First Amendment cases, Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. implies that immigrants, regardless of status,
may not be protected by the Constitution to the same extent as citizens, but
does not decide the issue. This allows the government, in current antiterrorism law enforcement initiatives, to proceed as if immigrants have no
rights and practice selective enforcement of the immigration laws with
impunity.
After repeal of the McCarran-Walter Act,235 Congress has continued
to provide for the deportation of immigrants based on associations
traditionally protected by the First Amendment. Affiliations with anarchism
and Communism have been changed to connections with "terrorist" groups,
and immigrants are singled out based on their political activities.23 6 The
USA PATRIOT Act, for example, defines terrorism in different ways for
citizens and non-citizens. 237 Domestic terrorism has a somewhat limited
definition, 238 while terrorist activity that makes non-citizens deportable
includes support for even the lawful or nonviolent activities of any group that
has also practiced violence and any use or threat to use a weapon "other than
for mere personal monetary gain. ''239 The definition of "support" has also
been broadened to include classic political activities like membership and
fundraising drives, even if those activities support nonviolent programs.24 °
However, rather than make use of these provisions, which might be subject
Miyamoto, supra note 168, at 205.
McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. 108-198, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The Act was repealed and
replaced by the Immigration Act of 1990. COLE, supra note 1, at 165; CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 68, at
141; Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 358, 104 Stat. 4978; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C).
236 As applied to immigrants, a "terrorist" group is no longer limited to those designated by the
Secretary of State under 8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii), but now includes an undesignated group if it is
composed of at least two people who engage in certain terrorist activities specified in 8 USC §
1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(llI). CHANG, supra note 77, at 62-63.
237 COLE, supra note 1, at 57-58.
238 Id. at 58 (citing USA PATRIOT Act § 802, amending 18 U.S.C. § 233 1(g): "acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws ... [and] appear to be intended... to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.").
239 Id. (citing USA PATRIOT Act § 411). The definition of "terrorist activity," as amended by
this USA PATRIOT Act provision includes: "The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance;.., seizing or
detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a
third person... to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of
the individual seized or detained; ... the use of any biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon
or device, or explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property; a threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing." 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)-(VI).
240 CHANG, supra note 77, at 62-63 (citing USA PATRIOT Act § 411 (a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)).
234

233
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to First Amendment challenge, 4' the government's current strategy relies on
routine immigration violations for the deportation of immigrants based on
actual or perceived suspect political affiliations.
The Supreme Court has left substantial confusion as to the rights of
immigrants. Consequently, Congress (in passing the USA PATRIOT Act)
and the Department of Justice (by using selective enforcement within antiterrorism law enforcement initiatives) both operate under the assumption that
immigrants have no right to equal protection or freedom of association. Cole
has predicted that if immigrants have no First Amendment rights within
immigration proceedings, they have no First Amendment rights anywhere.24 2
The same could be said of equal protection guarantees.
Immigrants are clearly the kind of minority group the Framers
intended to cover under the Bill of Rights. At the same time that immigrants
have become an increasingly large part of the United States, they have also
been the scapegoats of U.S. economic policy, from welfare reform to
immigration restrictions.243 Since September 11, this scapegoating has
reached a new level within the fight against terrorism. 244 Hate crimes against
immigrants have also increased, particularly against those groups targeted by
government law enforcement initiatives.24 5 While the government argues
that national security concerns call for a limitation on civil liberties, it is
precisely because of this context that immigrants should be afforded full
Fifth, Fourteenth, and First Amendment rights. Because immigration
proceedings are now the forum for law enforcement initiatives more
24 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), modified by the USA
PATRIOT Act, criminalizes various levels of support for groups the Secretary of State has designated to
be "terrorist." 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) and (B). A California District Court recently held the inclusion of the
language "expert advice and assistance" in this provision unconstitutionally vague, HumanitarianLaw
Projectv. Ashcroft, 309 F.Supp.2d 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004), following an earlier case that had found the
inclusion of the language "training" unconstitutional for the same reason. HumanitarianLaw Project v.
Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); and HumanitarianLaw
Projectv. Reno, No. CV 98-1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16729, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2001),
affid in partand rev'd in part,352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003).
242
COLE, supra note 1, at 136.
243See "Welfare Repeal" to Increase Poverty and The New Immigration Law at a Glance, NETWORK
NEWS (National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights), Fall 1996, availableat
http:l/www.nnirr.org/news/archived netnews/immigrlaw.htm. See Part I.
244 See Arnoldo Garcia, Editorial, No Nation of Immigrants Would Treat Immigrants This Way,
NETWORK
NEWS (National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights), Spring 2002, availableat
http://www.nnirr.org/news/archived netnews/nonation.htm. See infra Part I.
25 In 2001 hate crimes motivated by bias against ethnicity/national origin more than doubled
from 2000.
Anti-Islamic religion incidents grew by more than 1600 percent between 2000 and 2001. FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, HATE CRIME STATISTICS (2001), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Olhate.pdf. Immigrants were vulnerable even before September 11.
Undocumented immigrant workers do not enjoy full protection under U.S. labor and employment laws
and work for poverty wages in unsafe working conditions. See NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT
(NELP), Low PAY, HIGH RISK: STATE MODELS FOR ADVANCING IMMIGRANT WORKERS' RIGHTS 41
(2002), available at www.nelp.org.
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traditionally pursued within the criminal justice system, the civil rights of
those affected must be respected. By allowing the current government
position regarding immigrants' rights to continue without intervention,
immigrants will always be considered second-class members of U.S. society.
E. Currentlegal challenges
One post-September Illegal challenge may demarcate the limits of
the government's ability to infringe on immigrants' civil liberties in times of
national insecurity. Turkmen v. Ashcroft is the only legal challenge to the
experiences of the 762 September 11 detainees. The case names seven of the
detainees as plaintiffs, requests class certification to include all those arrested
and held "of interest" after the terrorist attacks, and claims violations of the
Bill of Rights, customary international law, and international treaties.24 6
Turkmen does not challenge the selective law enforcement
techniques leading to the arrest of the September 11 detainees, but instead
focuses on their detention conditions. The government held detainees under
conditions more appropriate for convicted felons, including maximum
security detention, twenty-three hour lockdown, and restrictive escorts.247
The government also subjected the detainees to mental and physical abuse,
total communication blackout, limited access to counsel, and detention for
weeks without charge, conditions which are usually perceived as violations
of the Bill of Rights.248 Specifically to accommodate detention of these
immigrants, on September 17, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft announced a
new interim rule allowing the INS to detain immigrants without charge for
forty-eight hours or in an "emergency or other extraordinary circumstance"
for a "reasonable period of time." 249 The INS took advantage of this
regulation, and a "reasonable period of time" became days, weeks, and
months. One hundred and ninety-two detainees waited longer than seventytwo hours to be charged, twenty-four waited twenty-five to thirty-one days,
twenty-four waited more than thirty-one days, and five waited an average of
168 days before being served with charges.25 °
In addition, the government instituted a "hold until cleared" policy
for these detainees. Even after they had finally completed deportation
proceedings, officials detained men until the FBI cleared them of connection
246
247
248

CHANG, supra note 77, at 75.
Id.
CHANG, supranote 77, at 85. COLE, supra note 1, at 34-35. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR

HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 38. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5.
249

§287.3(d)).
250

COLE, supra note 1, at 32-33 (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 48,224 (Sept. 20, 2001) (amending 8 C.F.R.
LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 103, at 34. See OFFICE OF

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.
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to any crime or terrorist conduct. 25'
Requiring this FBI clearance
demonstrates that the real interest behind the detention was criminal antiterror investigations, not immigration concerns. It took an average of eighty
days and as long as 244 days to clear detainees for deportation.25 2
The Turkmen complaint involves a number of violations of the Bill
of Rights. The majority of the claims are based on the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause. The claims list the conditions of detention, 2 3 coercive
interrogation,254 arbitrary detention (being held without charges and delays in
2-5
serving charging documents), 2s
confiscation of personal property, 256
257
communication blackout,
interference with counsel, 25 8 "high-interest"
259
designation with no criteria, and blanket no-bond policy. 26 ° The blanket
no-bond policy also figures into a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim,
along with the basic fact that the detainees did not receive the same treatment
as similarly-situated non-citizens and instead received harsher treatment
based on their race, religion, ethnicity and national origin.26 '
Turkmen's complaint includes Fourth Amendment claims of illegal
seizure based on the length of detention without charges or a hearing to
determine probable cause. 262 The lengthy pre-trial incarceration is also listed
as a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.263 The final
Bill of Rights claim is under the First Amendment's guarantees of right to
association and free exercise of religion. 264 Government officials held the
detainees under a communications blackout with little access to legal
counsel, failed to provide hallal meat or a chance to engage in daily prayer,
and subjected detainees to religion-based insults and verbal abuse.265
The complaint also involves violations of customary international
law and uses the Alien Tort Claims Act to give U.S. courts jurisdiction over
claims of arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.2 6
251 COLE, supra note 1, at 33. LAWYER'S COMMrTTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,supranote 104, at 34.
252 id.

253 Turkmen v. Ashcroft, Second Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 57,
2N4 Id. at 58, 1 177.
255 Id. at 57, 165-169 and 70, 1 250.

172.

'56 Id. at 62, 197.
27 Id. at 74, 1275.
258

Id.

259 Id. at 72, 265.
260 Id. at 71, 255, 260.
261 Id. at 59, 182.
262 Id. at 56,
263 Id.at 60,
264
Id. at 61,
265
Id.

160-164.
187.
192, and 73, 1270

266 Id. at 62-63, 1 203, 209. The Supreme Court recently affirmed the validity of the Federal Tort
Claims Act in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), although holding that Alvarez-Machain
himself had no remedy under the statute as his claim of false arrest by the U.S. government arose in
Mexico, thereby falling into the Act's exception to its waiver of sovereign immunity.
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The final claim is a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations because the government did not allow the detainees to contact their
consulates.2 67
Remarkably, the government itself has verified reports of the abuses
committed against the September 11 detainees in an April 2003 Office of
Inspector General report. 268 Given the range of abuses at issue, the Court
could uphold the government's preventative detention program and approve
of the initial detention of the plaintiffs but draw the line at the physical and
mental abuse they suffered, the overly restrictive detention conditions, and
the arbitrary length of time the government detained the men. Because of the
egregiousness of the abuses, it is possible that this case could, at the very
least, establish a threshold that the government cannot cross, despite the
limited constitutional rights afforded to immigrants in immigration
proceedings and the various legal doctrines supporting the federal
government's ability to discriminate based on immigration status and
national origin in times of national insecurity.
V. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHA LASTING CONCERN IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS

Aside from the impact on affected immigrants, the legal and tactical
decisions behind the government's law enforcement initiatives targeting
immigrants after September 11 are now expanding into immigration
In particular, the Department of Justice has asked
proceedings.
Administrative Law Judges and the courts to defer to the Executive Branch
in determinations of national security concerns and the designation of
particular immigrants as possible threats, effectively removing an important
check on Executive power.
A. Impact on All ImmigrationProceedings:In re D-JA recent opinion issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft, In re Dillustrates how the government's use of immigration status as a pretext
for anti-terrorism law enforcement is expanding beyond post-September 11
D.J. is an
investigations into routine immigration proceedings.
undocumented migrant from Haiti, intercepted at sea by the Coast Guard in
October 2002, along with 216 others from Haiti and the Dominican
Republic. 270 D.J. passed the "expression of credible fear determination"
j_, 269

267
268
269
270

Id. at 64, 212-16.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 4 at 142, 193, 195-98. But see id at 177.
In re D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003).
Id. at 576.
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required for an immigrant facing exclusion from the country and filed a
petition for asylum. 27'

Both the Immigration Judge and the Bureau of

Immigration Appeals said he should be released on bond pending his asylum
case. 272 D.J. had no criminal convictions, and his uncle in Brooklyn decided
to pay his bond and give him a place to stay.273 All of these factors usually
weigh heavily in favor of releasing the detainee on bond. However, Attorney
General Ashcroft vacated the decision for D.J.'s release-on national
security grounds. 274
The Attorney General had two primary national security arguments.
The first argument stated that allowing D.J. to go free would encourage
"future surges in .

.

. unlawful mass migrations .

.

. by sea ...

diverting

valuable Coast Guard and Department of Defense resources from
counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities." 275 The second
argument relied on a State Department assertion that Haiti has become a
"staging point" for migration from "third country nations (Pakistanis,
Palestinians, etc.)" creating a "substantial risk that granting release on bond
to such large groups of undocumented aliens may include persons who
present a threat to national security, as well as a substantial
risk of
276
disappearance into the alien community within the United States.,
It is important to remember that this case is a bond determination
that traditionally requires an individualized analysis. Attorney General
Ashcroft went on to say that this case constitutes binding precedent for future
decisions involving "similarly situated aliens," essentially making national
security interests now part of every future bond determination for a detained
immigrant. 277 The Attorney General stated, "Further, in all future bond
proceedings involving aliens seeking to enter the United States illegally,
where the Government offers evidence from sources in the Executive Branch
with relevant expertise establishing that significant national security interests
are implicated, Immigration Judges and the BIA shall consider such
interests." 278 In re D-J- would thus require deference to the Executive in all
immigration proceedings whenever
the Department of Homeland Security
279
inserts national security interests.

272

Patrick, supra note 162 at 6.
Volpp, supra note 105.

273

Id.

274

Id.
In re D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. at 579.
Id. at 579-81.

271

275
276
278

Id. at 581.
Id.

279

Volpp, supra note 105. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 45-

277

46. The govemment's attempt to ensure this kind of deference from the courts is also reflected in a May
28, 2002 Department of Justice interim rule allowing INS to close immigration hearings to the press and
public if "sensitive law enforcement or national security information will be disclosed." The directive
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This case further erodes due process rights for immigrants by
foregoing the usual individual analysis for bond determination and
attempting to ensure wide discretion for the Executive Branch when
detaining immigrants with a national security justification. 280 Attorney
General Ashcroft held that it is not a violation of due process to consider
national security in this setting.281 He distinguished Zadvydas v. Davis,
which afforded limited due process protection to immigrants already
"admitted," by emphasizing that D.J. had not yet been given the right to stay
in the United States.282
Attorney General Ashcroft also rejected the argument that "an INS
policy of detaining Haitian migrants in order to deter other Haitians from
283
migrating to the United States seeking asylum violates international law.,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and an advisory
opinion of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees state that
asylum seekers should not be detained for purposes of deterrence. 2 4 The
Attorney General stated that the UDHR is a non-binding "expression of
aspirations and principles, rather than a legally binding treaty," and that the
government's exercise of the plenary immigration power does not violate
UDHR or any other international law.285
In addition to In re D-J-, there are other signs that routine
immigration proceedings have been affected by the government's attempts to
roll back due process rights for immigrants in the interest of national
security. On October 31, 2001, the INS issued a new rule allowing the
government to detain immigrants charged with any immigration violation,
even if an Immigration Judge orders their release, as long as the initial bond
is $10,000 or more.286 Accordingly, since September 11, immigration bonds
have increased by five times or more, bringing more immigrants under the
purview of this new rule.287
B. Constitutionalityof Secret DeportationProceedings
requires immigration judges to defer to law enforcement agents in determining what is "sensitive."
CHANG, supra note 77, at 84. The same deference was recently used in Ctr.for Nat'l Security Studies v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), to deny a FOIA request for a list of the
names, attorneys, dates of arrest and release, locations of arrest and detention and reasons for detention of
those arrested after September 11.
280
Patrick, supra note 161, at 6.
281
In re D-J-, 23 I&N Dec. at 582.
282

Id. at 583.

283

Id. at 584.

284

Id.

285

Id. (citing HaitianRefugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 816 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
8 C.F.R. Part 3, INS No. 272-01; and AG Order No. 2518-2001. See CHISHTI ET AL., supra

286

note 68, at 55.
287 CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 68, at 55.
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Secret deportation hearings implicate the First Amendment rights of
immigrants, the press, and the public. Soon after September 11, Chief
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a directive closing all "special
interest" immigration hearings.288 The "Creppy Directive," as it is called,
requires Immigration Judges to defer to the Executive Branch's definition of
"special interest" detainee and provides "no definable standards" for the
classification.289
Two groups brought lawsuits challenging the Creppy Directive in
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft290 and North Jersey Media Group v.
Ashcroft.29 1 In Detroit Free Press, the Sixth Circuit found the directive
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 9 2 With respect to immigrants'
rights, the government argued that the court should defer in matters of
immigration, based on the notion that rights granted under the Constitution
cannot limit non-substantive immigration laws.293 The court rejected this
argument and held instead that the Constitution does not require special
deference to the government in immigration matters and can meaningfully
limit non-substantive immigration laws. 294 The court reviewed the Supreme
Court's immigration and First Amendment cases, from plenary power in the
Chinese Exclusion Cases to Zadvydas v. Davis in 2001, and determined
"there is ample foundation to conclude that the Supreme Court would...
recognize that non-citizens enjoy unrestrained First Amendment Rights in
deportation proceedings. '295 The "ordinary process of determining whether
closure is warranted on a case-by-case basis" strikes the correct balance, the
court said, between these rights and the security concerns of the
government.296
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit upheld the Creppy
Directive. 297 In North Jersey Media Group, the Third Circuit did not address
the issue of immigrants' First Amendment rights in deportation proceedings.
Instead, the court emphasized the "national security" context and a tradition
of deference to the government in such cases: "To the extent that the
Attorney General's national security concerns seem credible, we will not
Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, supra note 2.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681,692 (6th Cir. 2002).
2o
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
291 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538
U.S. 1056 (2003).
292
DetroitFree Press, 303 F.3d at 692.
288
289

293

Id. at 685.

Id.
Id. at 690.
2
Id. at 692.
29
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538
U.S. 1056 (2003).
2W

295
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lightly second-guess them., 298 In a footnote, the court clarified that "we do
not here defer to the Executive on the basis of its plenary power over
immigration . . . The issue at stake in the Newspapers' suit is not the
Attorney General's power to expel aliens, but rather his power to exclude
reporters from those proceedings... We defer only to the executive insofar
'2 99
as it is expert in matters of national security, not constitutional liberties.
With the issue of the immigrants' First Amendment rights aside,
both courts proceeded to discuss the traditional First Amendment analysis of
the right of the press and public to access government proceedings. In both
cases, the government argued that the deferential standard of access
articulated in Houchins v. KQED should apply. 300 Instead, both circuits
applied the Richmond Newspapers "logic and experience" test for the general
right of access to proceedings. 30 '
The Sixth Circuit emphasized the
similarities between deportation proceedings and judicial trials, even as
compared to other administrative proceedings, making 3the
Richmond
03
32
Newspapers test more appropriate; the Third Circuit agreed.
The Richmond Newspapers test has two prongs. The "experience
prong" directs the court to "consider whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public. ' 3°4 The "logic prong"
analyzes "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question. 305
The Third Circuit decided application of this test resulted in the
decision that there is no First Amendment right of access to deportation
proceedings. 306 Applying the "experience" prong, the court would not
recognize a general right of public access to governmental proceedings or
information and noted a tradition of closing sensitive hearings. 307 While
deportation proceedings are usually open and Department of Justice
regulations create a presumption of openness, that history is "too recent and
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access," the court said.30 8
The fact that some deportation proceedings are presumptively closed, as in
298

2W
3m

Id. at 219.
Id. at 219 n.15.
DetroitFree Press,303 F.3d at 694 (citing Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (emphasis

omitted)).

301 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
M2

Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 697-99 (6th Cir. 2002).

North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 208-09.
3(m Id. at 209 (citing Press Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (PressEnterprise11),
478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(internal quotations omitted)).
3o
Id. at 209, 216 (citing Press EnterpriseCo. v. Super. Ct. (PressEnterprise 11),
478 U.S. 1, 8
(1986)).
3o* Id. at 204-05.
303

307

Id. at 209- 10.

308

Id. at 211, 213.
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the case of abused immigrant children, and that deportation proceedings have
historically taken place in many locations, not always open to the public, also
influenced the court's decision.3°
In applying the "logic" prong, the court applied a revised version of
the usual test. As commonly articulated, this prong requires the court to
consider the positive value of open access to proceedings. 1 ° Case law
applying the test identifies various values served by openness: promoting
informed public discussion and perception of fairness, providing a
community outlet for concern, hostility, and emotion, exposing judicial
process to public scrutiny, and discouraging perjury. 311 However, the court
decided that it is also important to "take account of the flip side-the extent
to which openness impairs the public good. 3 12 With this addition, the
Government's national security concerns outweighed the values supported
by First Amendment access, and the court upheld the blanket closure of
special interest deportation proceedings.3 13
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, found a First Amendment right
of access to deportation proceedings applying the Richmond Newspapers
test. Under the "experience" prong, the court found the tradition of open
deportation proceedings convincing, especially because Congress expressly
provided for closed exclusion proceedings, saying nothing about
deportation.31 4 The court also noted that administrative proceedings are
"briskly evolving to embrace open hearings." 31 5 Under the "logic" prong, the
court considered the values mentioned above and found that all were served
by open deportation proceedings.3 6
Having found a First Amendment right of access to deportation
proceedings, the court then applied strict scrutiny to determine whether the
government had a compelling justification and whether the blanket closure
was narrowly tailored to the governmental interest. 31 7 The court found
national security concerns advanced by the Government to be compelling;
the court willingly deferred to the government agents who submitted
declarations about how terrorist groups might be able to glean sufficient
information from deportation proceedings to threaten the government's
'09 Id. at 212.
310 Id. at 216 (citing Press Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise11), 478 U.S. 1, 8
(1986)).
311
Id. at 217.
312
Id.
3,3
Id. at 218-220.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701-02 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 703 (citing 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14:13 (2d ed. 1980):
"The prevailing tendency... [is] to open all hearings of a somewhat formal character, overriding interest
in privacy and in confidentiality.").
314

315

316
317

Id. at 704-05.
Id. at 705.
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investigation of the September 11 terrorist attacks.31 8 However, the court
found the Creppy Directive not to be narrowly tailored, since the same
be served if the government closed the hearings on a case-byinterests could
319
case basis.

Before the Third Circuit made its final decision, the Supreme Court
allowed the closed immigration proceedings to continue. 320 Therefore, many
commentators expected the Court to grant certiorari and overturn the Sixth
Circuit decision. 321 However, the Department of Justice opposed Supreme
Court review of the Sixth Circuit decision because the Creppy Directive was
under evaluation and all of the September 11 detainees had already been
deported.322 This may have prompted the Court to refuse to hear the case.323
The Department of Justice has interpreted the Court's decision not to hear
the Sixth Circuit case as an affirmation of the Third Circuit decision and the
324
Some commentators have
constitutionality of the Creppy Directive.
suggested that the Court's refusal to hear the case also represents an example
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion that the Court should refrain from
deciding wartime cases that involve the clash between national security and
civil liberties.325 This case indicates that the Court may continue to condone
government anti-terrorism law enforcement initiatives that proceed on the
assumption that immigrants have no First Amendment rights, damaging the
rights of the press and public in the process.326

318

Id. at 706-07.

319
320

Id. at 707-710.
Ashcroft v. North Jersey Media Group, Inc., 536 U.S. 954 (2002).
t
Shirley C. Rivadeneira, Comment, The Closure of Removal Proceedingsof September 11 h

321

Detainees: An Analysis of Detroit Free Press, North Jersey Media Group and the Creppy Directive, 55
ADMIN. L. REV. 843, 863 (2003) (reviewing the opinions of various commentators).
322 Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 9-10, Ashcroft v. North Jersey Media Group, Inc.,
536 U.S. 954 (2002) (No. 02-1289), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/20021289.resp.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
323 Rivadeneira, supra note 321, at 863.
324 Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft on North
Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft (May 27, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/opa/pr/2003/May/03-ag-312.htm (last visited March 31, 2004). See
Rivadeneira, supra note 321, at 863.
325 Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies Behind Closed Doors: The FirstAmendment and
"Special Interest" Hearings, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (2003) (citing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE
LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 25 (1998)).

326 In another case about public access to information about the immigrants affected by postSeptember 11 law enforcement initiatives, the D.C. Circuit considered a First Amendment challenge to
the denial of a FOIA request for the disclosure of the names of immigrant detainees and their attorneys.
Ctr.for Nat'l Security Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (2003), cert denied, 540
U.S. 1104 (2004). The court upheld the denial, stating, "We will not convert the First Amendment right
of access to criminal judicial proceedings into a requirement that the government disclose information
compiled during the exercise of a quintessential executive power--the investigation and prevention of
terrorism." Id. at 935. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id.
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In reviewing the Third and Sixth Circuit's rulings on the Creppy
Directive, Harlan Grant Cohen has suggested that the Richmond Newspapers
"experience" prong to determine the right of public access to government
proceedings should not be limited to the question of whether a certain kind of
hearing has traditionally been closed or open, but should also consider the
lessons of history based on that tradition.
For example, the Palmer Raids
and Japanese internment are widely acknowledged as government mistakes,
the product of nativism and wartime hysteria. 328 This history of violating
immigrants' rights during wartime supports the decision that even national
security-related immigration proceedings should not be closed with a blanket
directive, but presumed open,329
and any closure should be narrowly tailored to
support a compelling interest.
In fact, the Richmond Newspapers test gives the public an extra
obstacle to information about government anti-terrorism law enforcement
initiatives by creating an additional hurdle before a prior restraint barring
access to a government hearing can be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test.
Richmond Newspapers' "logic" and "experience" test emerged as a way to
balance the rights afforded to the accused within a criminal proceeding, like
the potential conflict between a fair and public trial, and the rights of the
press and the public to speak and publish about government proceedings.3 3 °
Many of these same issues exist in the case of immigration proceedings, but
the use of immigration law to address national security concerns heightens
the risk of government abuse of power, as history has proven. The arrest,
detention, and deportation of hundreds of innocent Arab, Muslim, and South
Asian immigrant men in the name of anti-terrorism is exactly the kind of
government program the public needs information about, and the First
Amendment, in theory, guarantees that access. Only on a showing of a
compelling interest should the government be able to deny the public
information about anti-terrorism law enforcement initiatives-and any denial
should be narrowly tailored to a specific case.
VI. CONCLUSION

In June 2004, the Supreme Court handed down a series of historic
3 1
decisions about government anti-terrorism initiatives after September 11.
327 Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: DeportationHearings,
The PalmerRaids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2003).
328
Id. at 1472-73.
329
Id.
330 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576-77, 580 (1980).
331
Linda Greenhouse, JusticesAffirm Legal Rights of 'Enemy Combatants,' N. Y. TIMES, June
29, 2004.
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While the holdings do not have a direct bearing on the constitutionality of
domestic anti-terror initiatives targeting immigrants, the cases indicate the
Court's willingness to serve as a check for the Executive branch even in
times of national insecurity, and show that those the government has deemed
a threat should still have access to the judiciary in order to challenge that
designation. 332
Two of the cases involved U.S. citizens.333 In one of these cases,
Yaser Esam Hamdi had been initially detained in Afghanistan and then
transferred to a naval brig in South Carolina.3 34 When deciding that the
government did have Congressional authority to detain 'enemy combatants'
as Hamdi had been designated, the Court ruled that Hamdi's detention,
without charges and without an opportunity to challenge that designation,
violated due process.335 In a plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor implicitly
invoked the history of civil rights abuses in wartime, insisting that national
security concerns cannot automatically trump civil liberties: "[A]s critical as
the Government's interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an
immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing
international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression
and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat. 3 36 In fact, she
continued, war-time is the most critical time to respect constitutional rights:
"It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times
that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which
we fight abroad. 3 37 O'Connor rejected the Administration's argument that,
in the face of international conflict, the courts should forego individual
analysis of each particular case; the separation of powers inherent in our
legal system, she said, cannot allow that outcome: "We have long since
made clear that a state of war is not a blank' ' 38check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.
The third case involved non-citizens, foreign nationals arrested in
Afghanistan and held at the U.S. naval base at Guantdnamo Bay.339 The
332 Id. (stating "Although divided in its rationale, the court was decisive in rejecting the
administration's core legal argument that the executive branch has the last word in imposing open-ended
detention on citizens and non-citizens alike.").
333 Handi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004). Jose
Padilla was arrested at O'Hare International Airport. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. at 2715 (court stating he had filed
his case in the wrong court).
334 Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2636.
335 Id. at 2634 and 2648.
336
311

Id. at 2647.
Id. at 2648.

338 Id. at 2650 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.579, 587 (1952)).
339 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).
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Administration argued these individuals had no right to challenge their
detention in U.S. courts. 34 0 But, the Court decided that because the U.S.
controlled Guantdnamo, the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the
detainees' arguments that they never declared war with the U.S. and had
never committed terrorist acts.3 4
These decisions show that the Court will not allow the Executive
Branch to define a person as a national security threat so as to deny that
person the possibility of challenging that status. This and other broad
statements in the Court's holdings could undeniably apply to the case of
immigrants detained in the U.S. and held in immigration detention postSeptember 11. The Court's emphasis on the need to preserve civil liberties
and access to justice in war-time, and the Court's unwillingness to defer to
the Executive Branch's definition of threats to national security could be
helpful in challenging immigrants' detention due to anti-terrorism law
enforcement initiatives.
However, while the government's detention of the September 11
detainees had the same motivations as that of Hamdi, Padilla, and the
Guantdnamo detainees, the "win" in the recent Court cases bears little on the
constitutionality of selective enforcement of the immigration laws based on
protected categories. The plaintiffs in the recent Court cases are distinctly
situated from the September 11 detainees and other immigrants swept up in
post-9-11 law enforcement programs. Hamdi, Padilla and the Guantdnamo
detainees sued to gain access to the courts in the first instance. Even as
"aliens," the federal courts would have jurisdiction over the September 11
detainees; the more difficult question is whether the law enforcement tactics
resulting in their detention could be considered legal, not whether they would
be able to challenge that detention at all.
The government's post-September 11 domestic anti-terrorism law
enforcement initiatives have mired the civil rights of the September 11
detainees in an administrative quagmire. Instead of identifying true terrorist
threats and filing criminal charges, the government relied on minor
immigration violations to arrest, detain, and deport thousands of innocent
people. This government action based on the protected categories of race,
ethnicity, religion, and association could be constitutional because of the
legal doctrines that allow the federal government to classify immigrants
based on legal status and national origin. Ironically, if the September 11
detainees had been officially charged with terrorist acts, they would have had
far more due process rights.

340
34

Id. at 2693. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Id. at 2693, 2699.
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Instead of truly addressing domestic terrorism, the government set
up a "straw man" of the Arab, South Asian, or Muslim immigrant and used
the immigration system to appear to make the American people safe.
Immigrants are easy scapegoats, as the Court has failed to clarify their
uncertain standing under the Bill of Rights.
Consequently, after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, all immigrants face diminishing constitutional
protections. As the Hamdi and Padilla cases illustrate, the government will
not stop at immigrants, and U.S. citizens could easily face the same erosion
of civil liberties.
The Supreme Court has now given the Bush
Administration a warning. But the Supreme Court's challenge will be to
extend the same strong language and guarantee of protection to immigrant
detainees.

